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This paper studies the role of job search assistance programs in optimal welfare-to-work 
programs. The analysis is based on a framework, that allows for endogenous choice of benefit 
types and levels, wage taxes or subsidies, and activation measures such as monitoring and job 
search assistance for each period of unemployment in a dynamic environment with negative 
duration dependence in the exit rates to employment and potential depreciation in 
reemployment wages. We show that the main role of job search assistance is to delay or 
prevent situations in which it is no longer optimal to incentivize the worker to provide 
positive search effort. It is used to restore or maintain some minimum exit rate to employment 
which increases with the cost-effectiveness of job search assistance. We also find that in line 
with existing policies, these programs should mainly be used at the beginning of 
unemployment and for short durations. However, contrary to existing schemes, they should be 
exclusively targeted at unemployed workers with low initial exit rates to employment. For all 
other workers, they should only be used if they fail to find a job within reasonable time 
despite high expected initial exit rates. 
JEL-Code: J64, J65, J68, D82, D86. 





Swiss Institute for Empirical Economic Research 
University of St. Gallen 
Varnbüelstrasse 14 





This version: December 15, 2009 
The author is also affiliated with CESifo, Munich. I thank Gerard van den Berg, Monika 
Bütler, Michael Lechner, Alan Manning, Blaise Melly, Fabio Trojani, Stephan Wiehler as 
well as anonymous referees and various seminar participants for helpful discussions and 
comments. I also thank Michael Lechner for providing some of his GAUSS procedures, 
adapted versions of which I used for some of the estimations. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
In most countries, labor market policies for the unemployed rely on two sets of measures. Passive
income support during unemployment provides consumption insurance and gives job seekers the
opportunity to look for appropriate jobs. Active measures aim at increasing job seekers’ exit rates
to employment, e.g. by improving search eﬀectiveness or skills. Welfare-to-work (WTW) programs
are government programs that combine diﬀerent active and passive measures. Expenditures on such
programs are substantial, ranging from 1% to 5% of GDP in OECD countries (OECD, 2007). Job
search assistance programs belong to the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries
(OECD, 2007) because they are relatively inexpensive and because they have proven to be quite
eﬀective in many countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve
and Schmidt, 2002; Thomsen, 2009).
This paper studies the role of job search assistance programs in optimal welfare-to-work programs.
The analysis is based on an adapted version of the framework developed by Pavoni and Violante
(2007). This framework allows for endogenous choice of beneﬁt types and levels, wage taxes or sub-
sidies, and activation measures for each period of unemployment in a dynamic environment, which
is characterized by negative duration dependence in the exit rates to employment and potential
depreciation in reemployment wages. We extend the model by Pavoni and Violante (2007) in two
ways. First, we add job search assistance (JA) as a means to raise exit rates to employment to the
set of policy measures considered by Pavoni and Violante (2007). These measures include beneﬁts
conditional on job search (named unemployment insurance), beneﬁts unconditional on job search
(named social assistance), and job search monitoring. Second, we take into account that some
worker characteristics like job search skills aﬀect the job ﬁnding probability but not productivity
in the job. Pavoni and Violante (2007) only consider human capital that is assumed to aﬀect both
the exit rates and the reemployment wages.
We show that the optimal policy strongly depends on the job ﬁnding probabilities. Therefore,
neglecting some important determinants of the exit rates as in Pavoni and Violante (2007) may lead
to diﬀerent optimal decisions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that introducing JA has important implications for
the dynamics of the model: in contrast to Pavoni and Violante (2007), depreciation in reemployment
wages or negative duration dependence in the exit rates to employment are no longer necessary for
adjustments in the choice of policy instruments to be optimal during unemployment. If JA is
1suﬃciently eﬀective and job ﬁnding probabilities are low, it may be optimal to use such a program
at the beginning of unemployment and switch to passive measures or monitoring after exit rates
have increased suﬃciently.
Based on a quantitative analysis for an economy that resembles West Germany in the period 2000-
2002, we analyze the optimal use of JA as a function of its ability to raise job ﬁnding probabilities.
West Germany is an interesting case to study because it is comparable to most industrialized
OECD countries and it is the largest among the typical continental European economies, where JA
is an important and intensively used instrument to combat unemployment. Moreover, we can use
exceptionally rich and large administrative data that allow for most parameters of the model to be
estimated semi- or non-parametrically for the same sample of interest, which is a major improvement
over most existing calibrations of economic models.
We show that the main role of JA is to delay or prevent situations in which it is no longer optimal
to incentivize the worker to provide positive search eﬀort. If suﬃciently eﬀective, it is used to restore
or maintain some minimum exit rate to employment which increases with the cost-eﬀectiveness of
JA. The minimum eﬀectiveness required for JA to be used at all in the optimal policy is at the
lower bound of the empirical estimates, implying that JA will usually be part of optimal WTW
programs. We also ﬁnd that in line with existing policies, JA should mainly be used at the beginning
of unemployment and for short durations. However, contrary to existing schemes, JA should be
exclusively targeted at unemployed workers with low initial exit rates to employment. For all other
workers, it should only be used if they fail to ﬁnd a job within reasonable time despite high expected
initial exit rates.
Finally, a comparison of the policy actually implemented in West Germany in the period 2000-
2002 with the optimal scheme indicates a substantial ineﬃciency of the German system with respect
to both beneﬁt payments and the use of JA. Actual long-run beneﬁts were too high and expenditures
on JA were wasted as JA was ineﬀective in this period. We also show that there would have been
considerable gains from implementing tight monitoring in West Germany, at least for workers with
relatively low initial exit rates to employment.
Most existing studies that take a normative perspective on WTW programs have entirely fo-
cused on the optimal time proﬁle of beneﬁts when search eﬀort is unobservable (some of the main
contributions are Shavell and Weiss, 1979; Wang and Williamson, 1996; Davidson and Woodbury,
21997; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000; Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001).
This literature shows that beneﬁts have to decline with unemployment duration in order to provide
search incentives. Most of the still limited normative literature that takes into account both passive
and active measures studies the role of job search monitoring. For example, Fredriksson and Holm-
lund (2006) and Boone et al. (2007) compare optimal unemployment insurance with and without
monitoring and sanctions in a general equilibrium framework. Assuming random assignment of
monitoring, they show that welfare increases when monitoring is used. In a partial equilibrium
framework, Setty (2009) and Wunsch (2009a) endogenize monitoring intensity and the size of the
beneﬁt sanction and derive their optimal values as a function of unemployment duration, and in the
case of Wunsch (2009a), also of worker characteristics. Other active measures have been analyzed
by Coles and Masters (2000), who consider job creation subsidies and retraining, and Blanchard and
Tirole (2008), who study layoﬀ taxes. Moreover, Cardullo and Van der Linden (2007) and Van der
Linden (2003a,b) explicitly analyze interactions between the design of the unemployment insurance
system and the use of active measures like employment subsidies, monitoring, and training.
The studies that are most closely related to our work are Spinnewijn (2009) and Wunsch (2009b)
who analyze the optimal use of training that increases work-related skills in frameworks similar
to Pavoni and Violante (2007), i.e. with human capital depreciation during unemployment. They
show that training can be used to prevent reemployment wages from deteriorating to levels where
providing search incentives is no longer optimal. Combining this result with our results for job search
assistance implies complementary roles for training and JA: in the presence of both non-negligible
depreciation in reemployment wages and negative duration dependence in exit rates to employment,
only the combination of both measures can prevent the returns to search from deteriorating to
prohibitively low levels during unemployment. Another related study comes from Ribi (2009), who
analyzes the optimal size of job search assistance programs in a static general equilibrium framework
with homogeneous agents. She shows that there is a trade oﬀ between the positive eﬀects of JA
on the participants and the marginal increase in taxes that is needed to ﬁnance JA and distorts
employment decisions. Moreover, she ﬁnds that the optimal size of the program decreases with
increasing generosity of the unemployment system as additional funds have to be raised.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the details of
the model. Section 3 contains the quantitative analysis for West Germany. We describe in detail
how the model is parameterized using the administrative data and discuss the results for various
3interesting policy questions. The last section concludes. The appendix contains the proof of the
main theoretical result. Additional information on the data is provided in a data appendix that is
available on the Internet.1
2 The model
This paper uses an adapted but also somewhat simpliﬁed version of the framework developed by
Pavoni and Violante (2007) that focuses on the role of job search skills rather than human capital
and productivity in the job. The key elements of the framework by Pavoni and Violante (2007)
that are also part of the adapted model are outlined in the next section. Afterwards, the adapted
version of the model is discussed in detail.
2.1 The setup
Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), the setup considered by Pavoni and Violante (2007)
is a dynamic principal-agent problem. A planner (the principal), e.g. the representative of the
unemployment insurance or the welfare system, faces an unemployed worker (the agent) whose
eﬀort with respect to his activity is unobservable to the planner. Usually, it is assumed that the
worker’s only activity is job search. However, as illustrated in Pavoni and Violante (2005), the
worker may alternatively participate in, and devote eﬀort to, a WTW program such as training.
The objective of the planner is to design a contract which insures the worker against failure of his
activity by providing some income during unemployment, and which, at the same time, incentivizes
the worker to exert an appropriate level of eﬀort.
At the beginning of unemployment, at time t = 0, the risk-neutral planner oﬀers the risk-averse
agent, the unemployed worker, a contract which insures the worker against failure of job search or
participation in JA. This contract maximizes expected discounted net ﬁscal revenue of the insurer,2
subject to providing the agent with at least an expected discounted utility level of U0. From a
policy perspective, this is a more relevant case than the dual problem of utilitarian expected welfare
maximization subject to a budget constraint. Moreover, it allows writing the optimal contract in a
convenient recursive form (see Spear and Srivastava, 1987). The promised utility, U0, is exogenously
given, e.g. the outcome of voting, and can be regarded as a measure of the generosity of the welfare
1 Http://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/Conny Wunsch/58068.
2 Note that this is equivalent to minimizing net expenditure.
4system. Its level may depend on worker characteristics. In particular, the planner can give diﬀerent
weights to diﬀerent types of individuals in the social welfare function by requiring diﬀerent U0.
Net ﬁscal revenue is tax revenue if the worker is employed, and expenditures on beneﬁt payments,
monitoring, and JA if the worker is unemployed.
Workers are inﬁnitely lived and maximize expected discounted lifetime utility. They have time-
separable preferences over consumption, c ≥ 0, and eﬀort, a. Agents discount the future at rate
β ∈ (0,1), and period utility is given by u(ct) − at. Eﬀort is assumed to be either high (a = e>0)
or low (a = 0), which underlines the role of ﬁxed costs and the extensive margin of participation
decisions. However, the disutility of eﬀort during employment is generally not restricted to be the
same as during unemployment,3 but it must be ensured that accepting a job oﬀer always dominates
staying unemployed.
The planner can observe whether the worker is employed or unemployed, his activity (job search
or participation in JA) during unemployment, and the outcome of the worker’s activity, y ∈{ s,f},
where s denotes success and f failure. But the planner cannot observe the worker’s eﬀort choice,
a, so that he faces a moral hazard problem.
For each period t and contingent on all observable histories up to t, the contract speciﬁes the
transfers to the worker, the policy instrument to be used, and the corresponding recommended
eﬀort choice of the worker.
For simpliﬁcation, it is assumed that workers do not have access to savings, insurance or credit
markets. In particular, it is assumed that workers cannot self-insure against the random outcome
y ∈{ s,f} of their activity, e.g. by saving. Pavoni and Violante (2005) show that when workers
can save through credit markets but still face a no-borrowing constraint, which is a reasonable
assumption for unemployed workers, the same optimal contract can be implemented by introducing
a linear, time-invariant interest tax.
2.2 Introducing job search assistance
One important limitation of the model by Pavoni and Violante (2007) is that it only allows for active
measures that aﬀect both the job ﬁnding rate and the reemployment wages (through an increase
in human capital). Although this covers both formal training and programs that provide work
3 For example, assuming that eﬀort is the same during employment and search would imply that the worker searches
for a job with the same intensity and time input as he works.
5experience, it excludes JA programs, which are one of the most widely used activation measures for
the unemployed in OECD countries (OECD, 2007). The objective of these programs is to help those
unemployed without any severe skill deﬁcits to ﬁnd a job as quickly as possible. JA programs oﬀer
a combination of intensiﬁed counseling and training to improve job search skills, e.g. by teaching
the participants how to locate job vacancies and how to ﬁll out job applications, or by helping
them to prepare for job interviews. But they may also include some availability checks or other
forms of weak monitoring that make jobseekers search more eﬀectively. Therefore, they aﬀect the
employment hazard but not productivity in the job. In particular, they do not aﬀect wages. Usually,
these programs are short and thus less costly than traditional training or wage subsidies.
Besides being relatively inexpensive, the key argument in favor of JA programs is that they have
proven to be quite eﬀective in many countries, especially those programs with a substantial amount
of job application training (for evidence, see in particular the recent survey by Thomsen, 2009).4
This explains both the popularity and importance of JA programs. Therefore, these programs
should be taken into account when considering the optimal design of labor market policies. For this
reason, the economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2007) is enriched to allow for JA programs.
To study the role of JA in optimal WTW programs, individual heterogeneity in job search skills
is introduced into the model. A new state variable, p, is added that subsumes all individual factors
that aﬀect the exit rate from unemployment to employment under the label of search eﬀectiveness.
In order to both keep the model tractable and to focus on the implications of heterogeneity in
search eﬀectiveness and the role of job search assistance, the theoretical analysis abstracts from
heterogeneity in, and depreciation of, reemployment wages. However, in the quantitative analysis
we will consider this case as well.5
In our model, the job ﬁnding probability of an unemployed worker depends on search eﬀectiveness,
p, and search eﬀort, a ∈{ 0,e}. The corresponding hazard rate from unemployment to employment
is denoted by π(p,a), and it is assumed that π(p,0) ≡ 0 and that π(p,e) ≡ π(p) ∈ (0,1) is continuous
and increasing in p. We also assume that there is negative duration dependence in π, which is an
empirically well established fact in labor economics (see, e.g., the survey of the relevant literature
by Machin and Manning, 1999). In the model, negative duration dependence is induced by a
depreciation in search eﬀectiveness which can be motivated by the stock-ﬂow matching approach
4 For more evidence, see Fay (1996); Heckman et al. (1999); Martin and Grubb (2001); Dolton and O’Neill (2002);
Kluve and Schmidt (2002); Blundell et al. (2004); OECD (2005).
5 See also the theoretical analysis presented in an earlier version of this paper (Wunsch, 2007).
6(Coles and Smith, 1998). At the beginning of unemployment, job seekers start with the existing
stock of vacancies and may look for a particular type of job. If their job search activities fail, they
will have exhausted this stock of vacancies after some time and will start sampling from a new ﬂow
of vacancies. They may also have to change or extend the range of jobs they are looking for.
Job search assistance makes it possible to increase initially low levels of search eﬀectiveness or
to restore search skills that depreciate with increasing unemployment duration. It is introduced as
a technology that increases search eﬀectiveness with probability θ(a). This probability depends on
the eﬀort exerted during program participation, where θ ≡ θ(e) >θ (0) ≡ 0. For simpliﬁcation,
to avoid the necessity of modeling time allocation within a period, it is assumed that search and
program participation are mutually exclusive activities within a period, implying that participants
cannot exit to employment directly from the program.6 However, since the length of a period can
be arbitrarily small, this assumption is not restrictive.
2.3 The planner’s problem
The optimization problem of the planner is formulated in the recursive form proposed by Pavoni
and Violante (2007), with job search assistance added to the set of policy instruments and search
eﬀectiveness as state variable. Human capital as state variable (h in Pavoni and Violante, 2007) is
suppressed because, for simpliﬁcation and focus as already mentioned above, the theoretical analysis
abstracts from ex-ante heterogeneity in, and depreciation of, human capital. Therefore, a state is
deﬁned by the promised continuation utility, U, and search eﬀectiveness, p, i.e. by the pair (U,p).
At the beginning of each period, the planner chooses the optimal policy instrument, i(U,p), for an
unemployed worker who enters the period with state (U,p), by solving
V (U,p) = max
i∈{JA,JM,SA,UI}
V i(U,p), (1)
where V is the upper envelope of the values associated with the diﬀerent policies, which are described
in detail below. In each case, the planner chooses an eﬀort recommendation a(U,p) ∈{ 0,e}, the
transfer c(U,p) and the continuation utilities Uy(U,p) conditional on the outcome y ∈{ f,s} of the
worker’s activity. There is always a promise-keeping (PK) constraint, which ensures delivery of the
6 This corresponds to a so-called lock-in eﬀect of program participation, which has been documented in many
empirical studies (e.g. Gerﬁn and Lechner, 2002; Van Ours, 2004; Lechner et al., 2010; Sianesi, 2004, 2007; Jespersen
et al., 2008).
7promised utility U to the worker. Moreover, whenever positive eﬀort is required and eﬀort cannot
be veriﬁed, there is also an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint which ensures that it is optimal
for the worker to choose this eﬀort level.
Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), employment is assumed to be absorbing without in-
formational asymmetries in order to concentrate on the (current) unemployment experience,7 and
the planner can impose a wage tax or pay a wage subsidy as additional policy instruments. For an
employed worker and state (U,p) the planner solves
W(U) = max
c,Us w − c + βW(Us) (2)
s.t. U = u(c) − eW + βUs,
where eW denotes the disutility of work. W is independent of p because employment is absorbing.
Under the unemployment insurance (UI) scheme, the worker is required to search with eﬀort
e, and ﬁnds employment with probability π(p). With probability 1 − π(p), the worker remains
unemployed, and job search skills depreciate to a level pf ≤ p. The planner’s problem is given by
V UI(U,p) = max

















The ﬁrst and the second constraints are the promise-keeping (PK) and the incentive compatibility
(IC) constraints, respectively. Using the PK constraint, the cost of having to obey the IC constraint




βπ(p). It is increasing in the required eﬀort level and decreasing
in the employment hazard which, in turn, is increasing in p. Hence, this cost increases as search
eﬀectiveness depreciates during UI. Note that besides the incentive cost, there is also an eﬀort
compensation cost.
Under the social assistance (SA) scheme, the worker is not required to search (a = 0), and receives
some transfer that ensures delivery of promised utility U. Since eﬀort is zero, no IC constraint is
needed, which implies that no incentive or eﬀort compensation costs have to be incurred. The
7 Qualitative results for the same unemployment spell do not change as long as the job separation rate is exogenous.
Optimal contracts with endogenous job separation are studied by Zhao (2000) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009),
who show that in this case the optimal contract has to take into account the worker’s full employment history.
8planner’s problem is given by
V SA(U,p) = max
c,Uf,Us −c + βV(Uf,p f) (4)
s.t. U = u(c)+βUf.
If the planner chooses to monitor the search activities of the agent by using job search monitoring
(JM), he is able to verify the worker’s search eﬀort against payment of a cost κJM and solves
V JM(U,p) = max
















Note that the planner will never combine monitoring with low eﬀort because any deviation from
no search can be observed at no additional cost since π(p,0) = 0. Also note the absence of the IC
constraint because here, the planner can verify search eﬀort so that there is no incentive problem
during JM. This implies that monitoring is assumed to be perfect. Although monitoring may
be imperfect in reality, this serves as an interesting benchmark case for the optimal design of
labor market policies. The absence of the IC constraint implies zero incentive costs, but the eﬀort
compensation cost remains as high eﬀort is required from the worker.
Job search assistance (JA) is introduced in a similar way as training in Pavoni and Violante
(2005). If the worker is enrolled in JA, the planner solves
V JA(U,p) = max
c,Uf,Us −c − κJA+ β

θV(Us,p s)+( 1− θ)V (Uf,p f)

s.t. U = u(c) − e + β

θUs +( 1− θ)Uf
(6)
U ≥ u(c)+βUf.
Job search assistance is costly, requiring payment of a ﬁxed cost, κJA. It raises search eﬀectiveness
with probability θ(a).8 Since it is assumed that θ(0) = 0, the program will always be combined with
high eﬀort, as the cost of the program would not be compensated by any return if eﬀort were zero.
The assumption that search and program participation are mutually exclusive activities within a
period can be seen from the value function in case of success of program participation. It is not the
8 This incorporates the idea that the (expected) program eﬀect is increasing in eﬀort.
9value of employment, W(Us), but the value of continued unemployment of the worker, V (Us,p s),
with improved search skills ps ≥ p. Since positive eﬀort is required (a = e>0), both the PK and
the IC constraints are needed, implying that both the incentive and the eﬀort compensation costs





βθ, remain constant during JA while they increase during UI because of the negative
duration dependence in π(p).
2.4 Optimal sequence of transfers and policies
With constant reemployment wages, the structure of the model with search skills becomes very
similar to the one of Pavoni and Violante (2007) with human capital. In fact, in terms of the
dynamics, the model is an intermediate case between the two extremes studied by Pavoni and
Violante (2007), namely no dynamics, where both the exit rate and the reemployment wages are
constant during unemployment, and the case where both fall. As a consequence, most of the results
proven by Pavoni and Violante (2007) continue to hold in the adapted model presented here.10
They are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Because of the absence of the IC constraint, under employment and JM (no information asymme-
try) as well as under SA (no eﬀort required) it is easy to see that promised utility remains constant
and full insurance will be provided. Consequently, beneﬁts remain constant during JM and SA.
Moreover, since employment is absorbing, this implies that the value of an employed worker simpli-
ﬁes to W(U)=w−cW
1−β , where cW(U)=u−1
(1 − β)U + eW
. The implicit wage tax (if positive) or
subsidy (if negative) that is imposed on employed workers is thus given by τ(U)=w − cW(U) and
constant during employment. In the cases of UI and JA, the presence of the IC constraint requires
promised utility and hence beneﬁts to fall upon failure of job search or JA (as punishment) and to
increase upon their success (as reward).11
The wage tax/subsidy upon reemployment is one instrument to incentivize the worker. Because
promised utility remains constant during JM, the wage tax/subsidy upon reemployment remains
9 Note that monitoring the worker’s eﬀort in the program is very diﬃcult because the worker’s learning eﬀort, in
particular his attention and concentration, are very hard to verify.
10 The same is true in a model that allows for ex-ante heterogeneity in and depreciation of both human capital
(wages) and search eﬀectiveness For details see the ﬁrst version of this paper (Wunsch, 2007).
11 This result underlines the generality of the result ﬁrst derived by Shavell and Weiss (1979). Note that this is
actually in line with empirical studies on the eﬀect of sanctions, which suggest that reductions in beneﬁts do seem
to succeed in restoring incentives to search or to participate in activation measures (Van den Berg et al., 2004;
Abbring et al., 2005; Lalive et al., 2005).
10constant as well as long as reemployment wages are unchanged. On the other hand, the wage tax
(subsidy) increases (decreases) during UI and JA because promised utility falls if search eﬀectiveness
remains constant. Once it depreciates, the opposite may happen.
Regarding the optimal sequence of policies, Pavoni and Violante (2007) show that SA is always
absorbing because it is used at a point where it is no longer optimal to incentivize the worker and
where search skills continue to deteriorate, which further decreases the returns to search. They also
show that if both reemployment wages and the exit rates to employment remain constant during
unemployment, UI and JM are absorbing as well because no policy change is required if the returns
to search do not change.
When search eﬀectiveness depreciates during unemployment, neither UI nor JM are absorbing.
Since search eﬀectiveness behaves in the same way during JM and UI, the main diﬀerence between
JM and UI is that the incentive cost incurred during UI is replaced by the ﬁxed monitoring cost.
Since the incentive cost increases because of depreciation of p while the monitoring cost remains
ﬁxed, UI will only be used before JM as long as the incentive cost is lower than the ﬁxed cost,
κJM. Moreover, depreciation of p implies that a switch to JM becomes more likely with increasing
unemployment duration. Once κJM is lower than the incentive cost during UI, a switch back to UI
may only occur after successful use of JA because otherwise, the incentive cost keeps rising for UI.
Essentially, JM is a policy instrument to save incentive costs in the presence of negative duration
dependence in the exit rate to employment. Consequently, the typical sequence of policies in the
absence of JA is UI followed by JM and then by SA.
Having summarized the main results derived by Pavoni and Violante (2007), let us now look at
the role of JA in the model. JA has three main cost components. The ﬁrst one is absent under UI
and JM. It is the fact that participants cannot exit to employment directly form JA. However, since
the length of a period can be arbitrarily small this is not a big issue. The second cost component
is the incentive cost which is absent under JM but not under UI. Yet, the incentive cost under
UI, Us − Uf ≥ e
βπ(p), increases with the unemployment duration, while the incentive cost of JA,
Us −Uf ≥ e
βθ, remains constant. Thus, the use of JA relative to UI becomes more likely the longer
the worker remains unemployed. Finally, there is the ﬁxed cost, κJA, which is absent under UI
but, although potentially with a diﬀerent amount, present under JM. Consequently, we have the
following situation: the cost of UI is increasing over time, while those of JA and JM are constant.
11JA will be preferred to UI once the incentive cost of UI is higher than the incentive cost of JA plus
the ﬁxed cost of JA. The advantage of JM relative to JA is the absence of the incentive cost and a
potentially smaller ﬁxed cost. However, in contrast to JA, JM cannot prevent the deterioration of
search eﬀectiveness and thus the use of SA. Because the worker no longer searches for a job under
SA and because SA is absorbing, the optimality of SA implies extremely high net expenditures in
the long run. In the absence of JA, JM is used to save costs when the the deterioration of search
skills and the use of SA cannot be avoided. Once JA is available, it can be used to delay or even
prevent the use of SA, which creates a potential for considerably larger cost savings than with the
use of JM. Consequently, JA is likely to crowd out JM.
The possibility to use JA has another very important implication for the dynamics of the model.
One of the most important results shown by Pavoni and Violante (2007) is that human capital
dynamics, i.e. the deterioration of reemployment wages or the exit rate to employment, are necessary
for policy transitions to occur because the returns to search remain constant in this case. With
the availability of JA in a setting with constant reemployment wages, this is no longer the case,
even without depreciation in search eﬀectiveness. The reason is that even though UI, JM, and SA
are still absorbing in this case, JA might be optimal at the beginning of unemployment. This is
particularly likely if at the initial values of the state variables, (U0,p 0), the job ﬁnding probability,
π(p0), is very low and the returns to JA are large because the success probability of JA, θ, is high.
When JA is used at the beginning of unemployment for low levels of p0, search eﬀectiveness will
eventually increase. At some point, p will be suﬃciently large that a switch to UI or potentially JM
will be optimal, which will then remain optimal for the rest of the unemployment spell as p does not
decrease. The following proposition, which is proven in the appendix, states the conditions under
which deterioration of the job ﬁnding probability is still necessary for policy transitions to occur in
a model with JA:
Proposition: If reemployment wages are constant and search eﬀectiveness does not fall during
unemployment, the following result holds: if JA is not optimal at (U,p) and θ ≤ π(p), JA will never
be optimal thereafter if V is submodular.
Because all other policies are absorbing if reemployment wages are constant and search eﬀective-
ness does not deteriorate, this proposition implies that if JA is not used in period 0, i.e. at (U0,p 0),
it will never be used if θ ≤ π(p0). Because of the latter condition, this is more likely the larger the
12initial search eﬀectiveness, p0, and the lower the success rate of JA, θ. However, whenever JA is
optimal at (U0,p 0), the optimal policy will eventually switch to JM and UI because the returns to
search and the incentive costs during UI change when using JA. In the next section it will be shown
that usually, JA is indeed used under the optimal policy. Thus, the presence of job search assistance
in the model implies much richer dynamics than the setup studied by Pavoni and Violante (2007).
3 Quantitative analysis
In order to derive more detailed insights into the optimal choice over policy instruments, the model
is parameterized to resemble the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. West Germany
is an interesting case to study because it is comparable to most industrialized OECD countries and
it is the largest among the typical continental European economies, where WTW programs are
important and intensively used instruments to combat unemployment. Moreover, in the course of
substantial reforms of the German unemployment insurance system, there have been heated debates
about its optimal design in recent years.
3.1 The West German policy scheme 2000-2002
Before discussing how the model is parameterized, the West German policy scheme of the period
2000-2002 is brieﬂy described. In Germany, unemployment insurance is mandatory and employees
who have contributed for at least 12 months within the 3 years before entering unemployment are
eligible for unemployment beneﬁts (UB) if they register with the public employment service (PES).
The minimum UB entitlement is 6 months. In the period under consideration, the maximum claim
increased stepwise with the total contribution time in the 7 years before becoming unemployed, as
well as age, up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous contributions of at
least 64 months. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 67% (60%) of previous average net earnings
from insured employment with (without) dependent children.
Until 2005, unemployed workers could become eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) after
exhaustion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and potentially indeﬁnite. However, like
UB, UA was proportional to previous earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57% and
53% with and without dependent children, respectively). Those unemployed who were ineligible for
UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a ﬁxed monthly payment unrelated to previous
13earnings, means-tested, and administered by local authorities. In 2005, one of the largest reforms of
the German unemployment insurance system became eﬀective. The maximum UB entitlement was
cut to 12 and 18 months for unemployed workers below and above age 55, respectively. Moreover,
UA and social assistance were combined to a new ﬁxed means-tested welfare payment of normally
345 EUR, which is called unemployment beneﬁts II.12
Actual payment of beneﬁts is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the PES,
and participation in labor market programs. In case of noncompliance with beneﬁt conditions,
sanctions, i.e. reductions in or suspensions of beneﬁts, can be imposed. However, in the period
under consideration, search activities were not monitored very strictly due to capacity constraints
within the PES.
With respect to WTW programs, job search assistance has become by far the most important
activation measure in terms of the number of participants (1.1 million during the period 2000-
2002). Expenditures are moderate (on average, about 570 EUR per participant) because durations
are short (up to three months but usually about 1.5 months). In Germany, job search assistance
combines some counseling with a substantial training component as well as some availability checks.
The training component focuses on how to locate job vacancies, how to ﬁll out job applications,
and how to prepare for job interviews. The courses are usually full-time, which ﬁts very well to how
job search assistance is modeled in the theoretical part.13
3.2 Data and population of interest
With the exception of the preference and program cost parameters, all parameters of the model are
estimated using a large administrative database which has been built up by the German Institute
for Employment Research. This approach has several advantages compared to the usual procedure
of picking values from diﬀerent studies that are based on diﬀerent data, samples, time periods
and potentially even diﬀerent countries. First, it ensures that all parameters represent the same
population in a speciﬁc time period and a speciﬁc economic and institutional environment. Second,
it is much more transparent as to how the estimates are generated, making it much easier to judge
their validity. Third, it allows linking the simulation results to the population observed in the data,
which considerably improves the interpretation and understanding of the results.
12 In addition, UB II recipients can receive remuneration for housing costs (including water, electricity, and heating).
13 For further details on the German unemployment insurance system and WTW programs, see Wunsch (2006).
14The database used is a 2% random sample from all individuals who have been subject to German
social insurance since 1990. It covers the period 1990-2005 and combines spell information from
social insurance records, program participation records, and the beneﬁt payment and job seeker
registers of the PES. The database comprises very detailed and accurate information on several
dimensions. It provides detailed information on employment status on a daily basis for the pe-
riod 1990-2005. Personal characteristics include education, age, gender, marital status, number
of children, profession, nationality, disabilities, and health. The beneﬁt payment register provides
information on type and amount of beneﬁts received, remaining beneﬁt claims, and imposition of
sanctions. The job seeker register includes information on the desired form of employment, compli-
ance with beneﬁt conditions, and the number of placement propositions by the PES. Moreover, the
data comprise information on job characteristics such as type of employment, industry, occupation,
qualiﬁcation, and wages. With respect to program participation, the data cover the type of the
program as well as the planned and actual durations. Detailed regional information, which includes
federal state, local unemployment rate, migration, demographic and industry structure, infrastruc-
ture and urbanity, complements the database (see the data appendix A on the Internet for a full
list of variables).
For the simulation, the model is parameterized to resemble the population of West German
workers who entered unemployment from employment between January 2000 and December 2002,
and who received beneﬁts from the unemployment insurance system (UB or UA).14 To concentrate
on the main body of the workforce, apprentices, young men on civilian or military service, as well
as elderly workers in special forms of employment are excluded. This reduced sample consists of
76,304 observations and is referred to as the reference population of interest (RPI) in the remainder
of the paper.
3.3 Parameterizing the model
3.3.1 State variables, wages, monitoring cost and preferences
Time units are deﬁned by half-months. This is the smallest level of aggregation which is reasonable
with the data. Initial promised utility U0 ≡ U(p0) delivered to a worker with characteristics p0 is set
equal to the value implied by the actual system. It is obtained by plugging in the policy parameters,
14 This excludes recipients of social assistance, which is administered by local authorities for which no common
register exists. For this reason, individual data on these persons are unavailable in Germany.
15and solving backwards for the promised utility levels. The necessary information, i.e. the amount
of beneﬁts and the fraction of the RPI subject to each policy per half-month of unemployment are
calculated directly from the data. In the numerical solution, U is treated as a continuous variable
but is evaluated at 500 equidistant points in the interval [50,1000].
Reemployment wages are set to the level of the wage from the employment spell before entering
unemployment.15 For most of the analysis, the median wage per half-month in the RPI is used (860
EUR per half-month or 1720 EUR per month). To analyze how changes in reemployment wages
aﬀect the results, the median wages in the upper (1340 EUR per half-month or 2680 EUR per
month) and lower third (440 EUR per half-month or 880 EUR per month) of the wage distribution
are considered as well.
A ranking of the individuals in terms of search eﬀectiveness is obtained by estimating a probit
model for the probability of exiting unemployment within three months of becoming unemployed
as a function of personal characteristics (age, gender, education, nationality, number and age of
kids, marital status, health), detailed information on ten years of individual employment histo-
ries (fraction employed/unemployed/out of labor force/in programs, number and duration of past
(un)employment spells, employment status in speciﬁc periods), characteristics of the last job (wage,
full/part-time, industry, occupation, qualiﬁcation), remaining UI claim, amount of beneﬁt, compli-
ance with beneﬁt conditions, regional characteristics, as well as year and quarter dummies. The
predicted probabilities for each individual yield the distribution of p in the RPI (see the data ap-
pendix B on the Internet for the exact speciﬁcation of the probit model, the estimated coeﬃcients
and the distribution of predicted probabilities). In the numerical solution, p is discretized to 30 grid
points. For each grid of p, the value functions for all policies with respect to U are computed using
Chebychev polynomials up to the 20th order.
To parameterize the cost of tight monitoring, the average gross salary of a caseworker per half-
month (about 1200 EUR according to BA, 2001-2005) is divided by the number of unemployed
workers a caseworker can reasonably take care of in a half-month. A conservative number would be
20, which yields a value of 60 EUR. Allowing for some administrative cost, the baseline value for
κJM is set to 100 EUR.
Preferences are parameterized as follows. The half-monthly discount factor β is chosen to match
15 For part-time workers the wage is scaled up to obtain an approximate fulltime equivalent.
16an interest rate of 4% per annum, which prevailed in the EURO area in the period of interest.
Period utility over consumption is assumed to be logarithmic, i.e. u(c) ≡ ln(c), but speciﬁcations
with intertemporal elasticities of substitution below and above one are tested as well. To calibrate
the disutility of eﬀort, e, an approach that originates from common practice in calibrating macroe-
conomic models is used. Let the disutility of time spent working, n, be logarithmic as well, and
denote by φ the relative weight on leisure versus consumption. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function, the static optimality condition of the worker yields a value of φ =2 .35 given
a labor share of 0.73 (BMAS, 2003), a consumption-income ratio of 0.72 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2000-2002), and a fraction of time spent working of n =0 .3. This implies a value for the disutility
of work eﬀort of e = φ[ln(1) − ln(1 − n) ]=0 .84 (Chari et al., 1995). For the baseline calibration,
it is assumed that the disutility of eﬀort during unemployment equals the one during work. Yet,
as a sensitivity check, the case where only half of the time spent on work is spent on search and
program participation is considered as well.
3.3.2 Exit rates to employment
In the numerical solution, p is discretized to 30 grid points. The job ﬁnding probability correspond-
ing to the largest grid value of p is calibrated to the probability of exiting to employment within the
ﬁrst month16 of unemployment, which is estimated non-parametrically from the individuals in the
highest ﬁve percentiles of the distribution of p in the sample, yielding πmax = 19%. The exit rates
corresponding to the other grid points for p are geometrically spaced at rate 10% between πmax and
πmin =0 . 17 The corresponding exit rates as a function of the descretized values of p are displayed
in panel (a) of Figure 1.
The depreciation rate of search eﬀectiveness is estimated semi-parametrically as follows: we are
interested in the dependence of the exit rate to employment on unemployment duration for the RPI if
nobody participates in any activation measure. Ideally, we would like to observe the exit probability
of everyone in the RPI for diﬀerent unemployment durations. However, a substantial part of the
RPI participates in some program which potentially aﬀects the exit rate, and we observe the exit
rates between time t and t + 1 only for the subpopulation of the RPI that is still unemployed at t.
The problem is that program participation is highly selective and that unemployment duration is
16 Because of labor market frictions, the exit rate is very low in the ﬁrst half-month, and so the one-month exit rate
is a better proxy.
17 The results are insensitive to whether zero or a small positive number is chosen for πmin.
17Figure 1: Exit rates to employment as a function of p and unemployment duration
Note: High/medium/low search eﬀectiveness in panel (b) refers to the mean exit rate in the ﬁrst month of
unemployment in the upper/middle/lower third of the distribution of p in the sample.
endogenous: program participants and non-participants diﬀer systematically in characteristics that
also aﬀect the exit rate, and the same holds for individuals with diﬀerent unemployment durations.
To correct for these diﬀerences, all individuals that remain unemployed for at least x months
and do not participate in any program are matched to the RPI with respect to all characteristics
that aﬀect the exit rate and cause selection bias. Matching, i.e. selection based on observables,
is justiﬁed because the data allow us to observe all key factors that determine the job ﬁnding
probability. It particular, we not only observe the standard set of socio-demographic characteristics
but also health/disability, the kind of job that a person is looking for, occupation and industry-
speciﬁc experience, incentives provided by the UI system in terms of beneﬁt claims and beneﬁt
sanctions, compliance with beneﬁt conditions as a proxy for job search motivation and intensity,
and past performance on the labor market over the last 10 years, which allows controlling indirectly
for ability, motivation, productivity, and individual employment-related preferences. Finally, we are
also able to capture diﬀerences in regional labor market performance in a detailed way.
The estimator used is a robust radius matching estimator with regression adjustment proposed by
Lechner et al. (2010) and generalized by Lechner and Wunsch (2009), where matching is performed
on the basis of the predicted selection probability that is estimated from a probit model, and that
uses a triangular kernel to weigh observations. Using this estimator, the unobserved counterfactual
average probability of the RPI to ﬁnd employment within one half-month after x months of unem-
ployment is estimated and compared to the average initial observed exit rate. The estimation is
performed separately for x ∈{ 3,6,9,12,15,18,21,24,27} months. It turns out that the deprecia-
18tion of the exit rate is of the form pt+1 =( 1− δ)pt, where δ =0 .026 per half-month (see the data
appendix C on the Internet for the exact speciﬁcation and estimation results of the diﬀerent probit
models and the estimated exit rates as a function of the unemployment duration, as well as data
appendix E for the matching protocol). The resulting dependence of the exit rate to employment
on unemployment duration is displayed in panel (b) of Figure 1 for diﬀerent levels of initial search
eﬀectiveness.
The depreciation of p is implemented as being stochastic. The respective depreciation probability
is calculated from the parameterized depreciation rate (0.026) and the geometric rate at which the
grids p are spaced (0.1) which yield a value of 0.26.
3.3.3 Job search assistance
The optimal use of JA will be studied in two ways. First, JA will be calibrated to the actual program
implemented in West Germany in the period 2000-2002. This requires estimating the eﬀects of JA
from the data. Second, to obtain more general results, the optimal use of JA as a function of the
eﬀectiveness of JA is analyzed. For this purpose, the eﬀect on p is ﬁxed to an increase by one
grid point, but the success probability, θ, is varied. The ﬁxed cost of JA is calculated from total
expenditures per year (excluding beneﬁt payments), the number of participants, and the average
program durations from oﬃcial statistics (BA, 2001-2005). This yields program costs of κJA = 190
per half-month in EUR.
In order to calibrate the job-search-assistance technology to the German data, estimates of the
eﬀects of JA of diﬀerent durations on the job ﬁnding probability for the RPI are required. Each
period, the planner has to decide whether the worker should be assigned to a program or, if he
already attends a program, whether he should stay for another period. However, when trying to
estimate these eﬀects, two kinds of selection problems arise. First, as can be seen from the data
appendix A available on the Internet, the participants in JA diﬀer systematically from the RPI
in ways that are also related to the job ﬁnding probability. Second, actual program durations are
potentially endogenous. In the RPI, actual durations diﬀer from planned durations by more than
15% in 11% of the cases. Thus, actual program durations cannot be regarded as exogenous.
Given suﬃciently rich data, both selection problems can be solved using a so-called dynamic (or
sequential) treatment evaluation approach as suggested by Lechner and Miquel (2010). The idea is
19to consider a τ-period program as a sequence of τ one-period programs and to control for selection
at the beginning of each of the τ periods. Selectivity between program participants and the RPI can
then be controlled for at the beginning of the sequence (at t = 0), whereas endogeneity of program
durations can be accounted for by selection correction in the τ − 1 following periods. The eﬀect
of a program of length τ relative to a program of length τ − 1 can then be obtained by comparing
the sequence ‘participating up to t = τ’ with the sequence ‘participating up to t = τ − 1 and not
participating in t = τ’.18
Here, the population for which the eﬀects are to be estimated is an entry sample into unemploy-
ment that is deﬁned independently of any program participation later in the unemployment spell.
Lechner and Miquel (2010) show that in this case, the eﬀects of interest are identiﬁed under the
so-called weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA). This assumption states
that, ﬁrst, conditional on confounding variables at t = 0, potential outcomes measured from time
τ ≥ 1 onwards are independent of program participation in period t = 1. This would account for
any selectivity between program participants and the RPI. Second, conditional on participation
status up to time t and confounding variables of all periods up to time t, potential outcomes are
independent of participation in period t + 1. This would account for endogeneity of program dura-
tions. The third part of the W-DCIA is a common-support requirement which demands overlap in
the control variables between the populations involved in each of the selection steps.
To judge whether W-DCIA is plausible in this particular application, the confounding variables
for program participation relative to the RPI have to be identiﬁed. This comparison is mainly driven
by the diﬀerence between participants in JA and nonparticipants. In addition, those variables that
jointly inﬂuence the job ﬁnding probability and the changes in treatment status (i.e. the decision
between staying in JA for another period and leaving) have to be detected.
Selection into programs from the RPI is driven by program eligibility, selection by caseworkers,
and self-selection by the unemployed. By construction of the sample, all unemployed workers are
eligible because they receive unemployment insurance payments. Caseworkers select on the basis of
an assessment of the employment prospects and the speciﬁc qualiﬁcation needs of the unemployed.
According to the German legislation, they also have to take into account the chances of successful
18 An alternative way of estimating the eﬀect of programs of diﬀerent durations would be to apply the methodology of
Hirano and Imbens (2004) for continuous treatments (see, e.g., Flores-Lagunes et al., 2007). However, this method
assumes that selection into programs of diﬀerent durations is fully determined at the beginning of the program.
That is, diﬀerent program durations are not the outcome of intermediate decisions after the program started.
20completion of the program, and the local labor market conditions. Similar arguments apply to
self-selection by the unemployed because they also compare their employment prospects with and
without a program, as well as the corresponding costs in terms of eﬀort or potentially foregone
beneﬁts in case of refusal to participate. Thus, selection is basically driven by the same factors as
the ones aﬀecting the exit rate to employment discussed in detail above.
Decisions to leave or stay in the program are driven by factors that change after entering a
program. The most important factors are probably the arrival of job oﬀers, exhaustion of beneﬁt
claims, and signiﬁcant changes in health conditions. Other factors may be noncompliance with
beneﬁt conditions, changes in family status, moving to another place, and take up or loss of a minor
Job,19, which, including exhaustion of beneﬁts, are directly observed in the data. Changes in health
conditions are observed if they are severe enough to aﬀect unemployment insurance status. The
arrival of job oﬀers is not directly observed in the data, but the number of placement propositions
by the PES per spell is.20 To approximate the arrival of job oﬀers at or up to a speciﬁc point in time,
a Heckman (1979)-type selection model for the log number of placement propositions per day, that
accounts for zero propositions in the spell, is estimated in the subsample of nonparticipants using
a rich set of time-invariant (or deterministically changing) and time-varying variables measured
at the beginning of the program as explanatory variables. The number of placement propositions
at diﬀerent points in time is then predicted for all individuals in the sample using the updated
measurement of the time-varying covariates.
In summary, most of the potentially confounding factors are directly observed in the data. More-
over, those that are not directly observed either can be controlled for indirectly by information on
past employment histories and compliance with beneﬁt conditions (ability, motivation, preferences),
or they can be approximated by use of observed variables, like arrival of job oﬀers. Thus, the data
are suﬃciently rich to capture the main sources of selection bias at diﬀerent points in time before
and during program participation. In fact, this is the ﬁrst application of a dynamic treatment
evaluation approach for estimating the eﬀects of programs of diﬀerent (endogenous) durations.21
Lechner (2009) proposes a sequential nearest-neighbor matching estimator where the matching is
based on propensity scores to estimate the eﬀects of diﬀerent sequences of programs for a population
19 To provide additional work incentives, beneﬁt recipients can earn additional labor income without losing their
claim if they work less than 15 hours per week.
20 A placement proposition is a job vacancy proposed to the job seeker by the caseworker.
21 Another recent paper that uses this approach but focuses on the eﬀects of sequences of diﬀerent programs, and
the timing of program participation is Lechner and Wiehler (2010).
21deﬁned within one of the sequences. Consider the case where the interest lies in estimating the eﬀect
of the sequence S0 =( S0
1,S0
2) compared to S1 =( S1
1,S1
2) for the population deﬁned by S0
1. In the
ﬁrst step, the population deﬁned by S1
1 is matched to the population of interest, S0
1, based on the
estimated propensity score of the corresponding selection equation. Then, the population deﬁned
by S1
2 is matched to those observations in S1
1 that served as matches in the previous step based on
the propensity scores from this and the ﬁrst selection step. In a similar vein, the population deﬁned
by S0
2 is matched to the one deﬁned by S0
1 based on the corresponding propensity score. To obtain
an estimate of the eﬀect of interest, the reweighed outcome of the population deﬁned by S0
2 is then
subtracted from the reweighed outcome of the population deﬁned by S1
2.
Here, a modiﬁed version of this estimator is used. First, the eﬀects are estimated for a popula-
tion deﬁned outside the sequences under consideration. This implies that an additional matching
step has to be performed in each comparison. The populations deﬁned by the ﬁrst element of each
sequence under consideration have to be matched to the RPI before matching within each of the
sequences is performed (for the exact speciﬁcation of the selection models in each step and the cor-
responding results see the data appendix D on the Internet).22 Second, radius matching as proposed
by Lechner et al. (2010) for static evaluation problems rather than nearest-neighbor matching is used
to increase eﬃciency and potentially robustness given that the RPI is potentially large compared
to the populations deﬁned by the last element of the sequences under consideration.23
Table 1 displays the estimated eﬀects of JA of diﬀerent durations on the probability of ﬁnding
employment within three months starting from the point in time were treatment status is deﬁned
(e.g. after one month of JA when interest is in the eﬀect of completing two versus only one month
of JA). The eﬀects are estimated separately for the entire RPI as well as for subsamples deﬁned by
the lower, middle, and upper third of the distribution of p in the RPI. It turns out that in West
Germany in the period 2000-2002, JA is essentially ineﬀective independently of program duration.24
There seems to be some gain in employment from participating in the program for more than tree
rather than only three half-months, but the ﬁrst half-month of participation seems to have negative
impacts. Since program participation is costly, it can be presumed that under these particular
22 See Lechner and Wunsch (2009) for the basic idea of estimating eﬀects for populations deﬁned independently of
treatment status.
23 If the comparison population is small relative to the population for which the eﬀects are estimated, using more
than one similar observation prevents that one particular observation gets too much weight.
24 This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Wunsch and Lechner (2008), who analyze the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent forms
of job search assistance using the same database but a static evaluation approach.
22circumstances, JA would not be part of the optimal policy.
Table 1: Estimated eﬀects of JA of diﬀerent durations
Full sample Low search Medium search High search
eﬀectiveness eﬀectiveness eﬀectiveness
Comparison Eﬀect SE Obs. Eﬀect SE Obs. Eﬀect SE Obs. Eﬀect SE Obs.
JA1 - NP -0.036 0.019 1759 0.003 0.025 660 -0.028 0.028 673 -0.095 0.045 426
JA2 - JA1 -0.021 0.029 1218 0.011 0.036 465 -0.027 0.041 454 0.044 0.066 299
JA3 - JA2 -0.019 0.031 1182 -0.040 0.035 476 0.040 0.043 448 -0.085 0.072 258
JA3P - JA3 0.079 0.030 1591 0.060 0.033 678 0.009 0.045 569 0.062 0.079 344
Note: Diﬀerence in the probability to exit to employment within 3 months in percentage points. NP: non-
participation, JAn: completion of n half-months of JA. Bold/bold italics/italics indicate signiﬁcance
on the 1/5/10% level. Obs. is the number of treated observations. SE is the standard error. For each
comparison, less than 1% of the RPI are deleted due a lack of common support.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Optimal choice of policies as a function of (U,p)
Before looking at speciﬁc policy questions, we want to obtain a better understanding of the dynamics
of the model as calibrated to the German economy in the period 2000-2002. Figure 2 displays the
optimal choice of policies in the (U,p) space for a medium-skilled worker (w = 1720 EUR per
month) when diﬀerent choice sets are available. As can be seen from panel (a), if only SA or UI
are available, absorbing SA is used when the returns to search, i.e. the job ﬁnding probability, π(p),
are too low to incentivize the worker, or when promised utility is too high, making it too costly to
incentivize the worker when returns to search are not suﬃciently large. Panel (b) shows that if JM
becomes available, it is an eﬀective tool to save the incentive costs of UI when the returns to search
are low or promised utility is high, and to prevent SA at very high levels of U. At an intermediate
value of initial promised utility and high initial search eﬀectiveness, the optimal policy will start
with UI. During UI, promised utility falls and search eﬀectiveness deteriorates so that we move to
the south west in panel (b), making JM the optimal policy after some time. At low initial levels of
p, JM will be optimal from the beginning of unemployment. Eventually, p will be so low that the
sum of the eﬀort compensation cost and the monitoring cost becomes too high given the very low
returns to search, making SA less costly than JM.
In panels (c)-(l), the choice set also includes JA. In these ﬁgures, the probability that the job
ﬁnding probability increases by one grid point (10%) is varied in 10%-steps between 10% and 100%
(θ ∈{ 0.1,0.2,...,1.0}). It turns out that JA is not optimal for any combination (U,p) when θ =0 .1.
In fact, the success probability must be at least 15% for JA to be used at all in the optimal policy
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Note: At the right boundary of p where the optimal policy switches from JA to UI, V
JA and V
UI are very
close. Therefore, it can sometimes happen that there are multiple switches between JA and UI as U
increases for a given p. In such cases, the ﬁgures show UI up to the largest value of U for which UI is
optimal.
scheme. Clearly, costly JA is not used whenever θ ≤ π(p) because in this case the incentive cost
exceeds that of UI. However, even if θ>π (p), which is the case for p ≤ 27 if θ =0 .15, the ﬁxed
costs of JA prevents its use if the returns to JA are not suﬃciently high.
Up to a success probability of 40%, JA will only be used if the returns to search are very low
and if promised utility is not too large. If p, and hence π(p), is very low, the returns to JA are
particularly high as not only the returns to search can be increased but also the use of very costly
and absorbing SA can be prevented. As a consequence of optimal use of JA at p = 1, the range
of values of (U,p) for which UI is optimal rather than JM increases, thus reducing the importance
of JM. The reason is that at any given (U,p), the optimal policy takes into account which policies
24will be optimal in the future once p depreciates or increases after use of JA and as U potentially
changes starting from (U,p). As p depreciates during unemployment and if promised utility is not
too high, there will eventually be a point in time where JA will be used rather than SA. Since JA
is much less costly than SA and since it increases p, the planner can aﬀord to use UI also for lower
levels of p than in the absence of JA, as long as U is not too high. What happens is that the same
utility can be provided for a given level of p by shifting expenditures from later periods, where SA
would be optimal in the absence of JA, to earlier periods.
As the success probability of JA increases, the use of JA also increases, crowding out in particular
JM but also UI. At θ =0 .5, JA will be used not only for p = 1 but also at intermediate values of
(U,p). For lower U, UI is still less costly as the ﬁxed cost of JA can be saved. For lower p, the
prospect to use JA when p = 1 suﬃces to keep UI least costly. For θ ≥ 0.6, JA is used for all levels
of p up to a threshold which increases with θ. Moreover, it is used for all but very high levels of U,
where the corresponding threshold also increases with θ. Finally note that for θ ≥ 0.6, JA is able to
prevent the job ﬁnding probability from deteriorating to levels at which it is no longer optimal to
incentivize the worker. Consequently, very costly SA is no longer part of the optimal policy scheme
which implies a potential for considerable budget savings.
In the following sections, the parameterized model is used to answer a range of interesting policy
questions. First, the optimality of the policy implemented in West Germany in the period 2000-2002
is assessed by comparing it with the optimal scheme that results when the same initial utility is
delivered to workers as implied by the actual system. Second, the potential beneﬁts of tightening
monitoring in West Germany are evaluated. Third, to draw some general conclusions on the optimal
use of job search assistance, ranges of parameter values for which these programs are optimally used,
as well as their optimal duration and timing within the unemployment spell, are derived.
3.4.2 Assessing the West German policy 2000-2002
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the sequence of policies that would have been optimal for West Germany
in the period 2000-2002 in the absence of JM, given that the same level of initial utility U(p0)i s
provided as under the actual policy. JM, which is assumed to be perfect in the model, is excluded
for the moment because in the period under consideration, search activities were not monitored
very strictly due to capacity constraints within the PES. As JA was ineﬀective in this period, UI
and SA are the only policy instruments left.
25As initial promised utility under the actual policy, U(p0), varies between 430-570, it can be seen
from panel (a) of Figure 2 that SA will only be used at p = 1, where the returns to search are
essentially zero.25 Consequently, for p0 > 1, the optimal policy will start with UI but will switch to
SA once search eﬀectiveness deteriorates to p = 1. The higher the initial search eﬀectiveness, p0,
the longer it will take in the unemployment spell to reach this point. For low (p = 19), medium
(p = 25), and high search eﬀectiveness (p = 29), as deﬁned by the mean initial exit rate in the lower,
middle, and upper third of the distribution of p in the data, UI will be optimal for unemployment
durations of up to 39.5, 49, and 55 months, respectively. It is important to note, though, that
this does not mean that maximum unemployment insurance claim durations should be that long.
It just means that it is optimal to condition beneﬁt payments on job search eﬀort for this period,
regardless of whether they are unemployment insurance payments or welfare payments ﬁnanced by
tax revenue. In the model, UI is just a label for beneﬁts conditional on job search and it has nothing
to do with the source of the funding.
Figure 3: Optimal policy for West Germany 2000-2002
Note: The results displayed in panel (b) are for a worker with median reemployment wage and medium initial
search eﬀectiveness (w = 1720 EUR per month, p0 = 25, π(25) = 11%).
For a worker with medium reemployment wage and search eﬀectiveness, panel (b) of Figure 3
shows that optimal beneﬁts decline during UI as predicted by the model to provide intertemporal
search incentives by punishing job search failure. The optimal replacement rate starts at 63% and
declines to 24% when SA becomes optimal. From this point onwards, the beneﬁt remains constant at
a level of about 400 EUR per month. Interestingly, this is very close to the level of unemployment
beneﬁts II (345 EUR), which have been introduced recently in Germany as the baseline welfare
payment that can be received exhaustion of UI.
25 As already stated earlier, the results are insensitive to whether zero or a small positive number is chosen for π(1).
26Within the ﬁrst 36 month of unemployment, optimal beneﬁts are higher than the actual ones, but
are considerably smaller thereafter. Lower long-run beneﬁts are the main reason for considerable
budget savings that could be realized by implementing the optimal instead of the actual policy.
For low, medium, and high initial search eﬀectiveness, the total budget savings amount to 18%,
4%, and 1%, respectively. The savings are largest for low levels of p0 because at low job ﬁnding
probabilities, expected tax revenue is very low. Consequently, in these cases the amount of long-run
beneﬁts, which are too high under the actual policy, is the main determinant of net ﬁscal revenue.
In contrast, for high levels of p0 and π(p0), tax revenue has a much larger weight than the savings
in terms of long-run beneﬁts under the optimal policy. In fact, for medium search eﬀectiveness in
panel (b) of Figure 3, the average optimal wage tax is somewhat larger than the actual one.26 This
yields higher tax revenue in addition to the budget savings from lower long-run beneﬁts as well as
the savings from not using ineﬀective but costly JA. However, initial beneﬁts are also relatively
large, which yields the moderate amount of budget savings of 4% at p = 25.
3.4.3 The value of tight monitoring
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that if monitoring could be tightened to resemble perfect JM, it would
be used in the optimal scheme. The total duration for which it is optimal to incentivize agents
remains unchanged, because it is determined by the deterioration of the job ﬁnding probability,
which is unaﬀected by JM. However, the relative use of JM and UI depends on the relation of the
incentive costs during UI to the monitoring cost. If p and π(p) are already low at the beginning
of unemployment (p ≤ 21, π ≤ 7%), the incentive costs of UI are higher than the ﬁxed monitoring
cost, making JM optimal from the beginning of unemployment. For suﬃciently high levels of p
and π(p), the optimal policy starts with UI but switches to JM as π(p) decreases, and hence the
incentive cost of UI increases relative to the ﬁxed monitoring cost and eventually becomes larger
than κJM. As a consequence, UI is used for longer periods while JM is used for shorter periods the
higher p. The additional budget savings from JM relative to the optimal policy when only UI and
SA are available are very small for high levels of p, but can be substantial for low levels of p because
in this case, the savings in terms of UI incentive costs are particularly high. For low, medium, and
high initial search eﬀectiveness the budget savings are 10%, 2%, and less than 1%, respectively.




βπ(p) is needed to incentivize
the worker. However, as depreciation of p is implemented stochastically in the simulation, the wage tax will
increase as long as p remains constant but promised utility and hence beneﬁts fall during UI.
27Figure 4: Optimal use of job search monitoring
Note: The results displayed in panel (b) are for a worker with median reemployment wage and medium initial
search eﬀectiveness (w = 1720 EUR per month, p0 = 25, π(25) = 11%).
In panel (b) of Figure 4, κJM is varied from 100 to 1000 EUR per half-month. The results are
displayed for a worker with medium search eﬀectiveness (p = 25). Naturally, the use of JM is
reduced with increasing cost. JM is used later in the unemployment spell after prolonged use of UI,
because the increasing incentive cost of UI stays below the monitoring cost for longer periods. As
a result of longer UI, beneﬁts decline to lower levels the larger κJM, which compensates to some
extent for the higher monitoring cost so that JM is still optimal at some point in the unemployment
spell. For κJM ≥ 700 EUR though, the monitoring cost becomes prohibitively large, making JM
no longer optimal.
3.4.4 Optimal use of job search assistance
One conclusion from the international evidence on the eﬀects of job search assistance on the job
ﬁnding probability is that the eﬀectiveness of JA varies with the particular type of the program as
well as the time period and country considered. In West Germany, for example, JA has been shown
to be ineﬀective, whereas for both earlier and later periods, positive eﬀects have been estimated
(see Thomsen, 2009, for a survey of the German and the international evidence). Therefore, it is
important to analyze the optimal use of JA as a function of its ability to raise exit rates to employ-
ment. For this purpose, the potential increase in p caused by JA is ﬁxed to one grid point (10%),
and the success probability, θ, is varied in 10%-steps between 10% and 100%. The corresponding
expected causal eﬀects of JA on π(p) are displayed in Figure 5. As shown in the note to this ﬁgure,
the expected potential outcomes, E(π1
JA) and E(π0
JA), can be calculated from the rate at which
the grids for p are spaced (γ =0 .1), the depreciation probability for p (δ =0 .26), and the success
28probability of JA (θ). Because a geometric grid is chosen for p, the eﬀect in percent is constant
across p, but increases with p in percentage points. The implied eﬀects in percentage points, which
are the usual measures we see in empirical studies, cover the typical range of empirical ﬁndings
(Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dolton and O’Neill, 2002; Kluve and
Schmidt, 2002; Blundell et al., 2004; OECD, 2005; Thomsen, 2009).
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The ﬁrst result that was already stated in Section 3.4.1 is that the success probability must be
at least 15% for JA to be optimal at all for any (U,p). For an initial promised utility as implied by
the actual West German policy during the period 2000-2002, the required minimum eﬀectiveness is
even higher. In this case, θ must be at least 22%, which corresponds to an expected eﬀect on the
exit rate of about 3% or 0.03 to 0.5 percentage points. However, this is at the lower bound of the
empirical estimates, implying that JA will usually be part of optimal WTW programs.
Figure 6 summarizes the main results for the optimal use of JA as a function of θ. Panel (a)
displays the range of values of p and the corresponding job ﬁnding probabilities, π(p), for which it
is optimal to use JA. As discussed above, JA is not optimal for θ<0.22. For 0.22 ≤ θ<0.5, JA
should only be used once the exit rate has deteriorated to extremely low levels (p = 1) to prevent
particularly costly SA. Otherwise, the returns of JA are too small given the still relatively high
incentive cost and the ﬁxed cost of JA. At θ =0 .5, JA will also be used at intermediate levels of
p as discussed in Section 3.4.1. For θ ≥ 0.6, JA is optimal for the complete lower range of search
eﬀectiveness. This range increases with θ, starting at p = 15 for θ =0 .6 and reaching p = 24 for
θ = 1. Note, however, that even for a success probability of one JA is only optimal for the lower
29part of the distribution of search eﬀectiveness or job ﬁnding rates: the middle of the distribution
lies at p =2 5o rπ(25) = 11%.
Figure 6: Optimal use of job search assistance
The results in panel (a) have direct implications for the optimal timing of JA within the unem-
ployment spell and its optimal duration. Whenever initial search eﬀectiveness, p0, lies within the
displayed range of p, JA should be used at the beginning of unemployment. Otherwise, it should
only be used later in the unemployment spell once search eﬀectiveness has deteriorated to a level
within this range. Moreover, for θ ≥ 0.6, JA should be used until the the upper bound of the
displayed range of p is reached. Thereafter, UI will usually be optimal until p depreciates below
the threshold level that makes JA optimal once again. Essentially, after JA has increased p to the
threshold level, there will be multiple switches between UI and JA. Consequently, the combination
of JA and UI completely crowds out the use of both SA and JM. The only case where JM would
be optimal rather than UI is when promised utility is very high because incentivizing the worker
would be too costly in this case (see Figure 2). In summary, JA can be used to prevent situations in
which the returns to search are so low that it is no longer optimal to incentivize the worker and SA
becomes optimal. In particular, JA can restore or maintain some minimum exit rate to employment
30that increases with the success probability of JA. As a result, it dominates both SA and JM, leaving
UI as the optimal policy whenever JA is not optimal.
Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows the optimal timing of JA within the unemployment spell for three
types of workers that represent the lower (p = 19), middle (p = 25), and upper third (p = 29) of the
distribution of search eﬀectiveness in the data. Corresponding to the range of values of p displayed
in panel (a) for which JA is optimal, JA should only be used relatively late in the unemployment
spells when initial search eﬀectiveness is high. The same holds for medium levels of p0 as long as θ
is below its maximum. For workers with low p0, JA is optimal at the beginning of unemployment
for θ ≥ 0.8, and it should start after one half-month of unemployment for θ =0 .7. At lower levels of
θ, JA should only be used with longer unemployment durations. Note, however, from Figure 5 that
for p0 = 19, the implied eﬀect on the exit rate is still moderate even for θ ≥ 0.8, which suggests that
under normal circumstances JA should be used at the beginning of unemployment for workers with
relatively low search eﬀectiveness. For all other workers JA, should only be used if they fail to ﬁnd a
job within reasonable time despite high expected initial exit rates. Note also that early use of JA is
actually common practice in most existing WTW programs. However, in many countries, including
Germany, JA is used quite extensively for all types of workers. In these countries the targeting of
JA should be improved by focusing the use of JA on workers with relatively low predicted exit rates.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 6 show the optimal average and maximum durations of JA for the
three representative types of workers. As is common in the majority of existing WTW programs,
the optimal duration of JA is short. It rarely exceeds one month and never exceeds 3.5 months.
The optimal duration depends on how long a worker stays at a particular level of p. On the one
hand, this is determined by the success probability of JA: the higher θ, the faster the boundary of
p from which JA will no longer be optimal is reached. Consequently, the optimal duration of JA
decreases with increasing θ. On the other hand, the depreciation probability of p negatively aﬀects
how long workers stay at a given p.
The budget implications of the availability of eﬀective JA depend on both the initial search
eﬀectiveness, p0, and the success probability, θ. Naturally, the budget savings are larger the larger
θ. Moreover, as costly SA without tax revenue is the dominant policy early in the unemployment
spell when p0 is small, and since JA can be used to prevent this, they are also higher the lower
p0. Consequently, for workers with low initial search eﬀectiveness (p0 = 19), the additional budget
31savings relative to the optimal policy with SA, UI, and JM range from 2% to as much as 28% as θ
varies from 0.3 to 1. For workers with medium initial search eﬀectiveness (p0 = 25), the savings are
considerably smaller, ranging from below 1% to at most 4%. The budget savings for a worker with
high initial search eﬀectiveness (p0 = 29) are negligible as they are below 1% for all values of θ.
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(a) JA with θ=0.3 and κJA = 100 EUR per half-month U
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(b) JA with θ=0.3 and κJA = 190 EUR per half-month U
p











1 3 5 7 9 1 11 31 51 71 92 12 32 52 72 9
(c) JA with θ=0.3 and κJA = 300 EUR per half-month U
p
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(d) JA with θ=0.5 and κJA = 100 EUR per half-month U
p
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(e) JA with θ=0.5 and κJA = 190 EUR per half-month U
p
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(f) JA with θ=0.5 and κJA = 300 EUR per half-month U
p
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(g) JA with θ=0.7 and κJA = 100 EUR per half-month U
p
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(h) JA with θ=0.7 and κJA = 190 EUR per half-month U
p
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(i) JA with θ=0.7 and κJA = 300 EUR per half-month U
p
UI SA    JM    JA
Note: At the right boundary of p where the optimal policy switches from JA to UI, V
JA and V
UI are very
close. Therefore, it can sometimes happen that there are multiple switches between JA and UI as U
increases for a given p. In such cases, the ﬁgures show UI up to the largest value of U for which UI is
optimal.
Figure 7 ﬁnally illustrates for selected values of θ how the optimal use of JA depends on the ﬁxed
cost κJA. The baseline value is 190 EUR per half-month. The corresponding optimal policy choices
in the (U,p) space are displayed in panels (b), (e), and (h). In panels (a), (d), and (g) the ﬁxed cost
is reduced to 100 EUR per half-month, which implies equal ﬁxed costs for JM and JA. In panels
(c), (f), and (i), the ﬁxed cost is increased to 300 EUR per half-month. The range of values of both
U and p for which JA is optimal increases as the ﬁxed cost decreases. Consequently, the use of
UI also increases, while the use of JM decreases. However, the overall picture remains unchanged
in the sense that JA is not optimal for θ ≤ 0.2, is only optimal for p = 1 when 0.2 <θ≤ 0.4, is
optimal for both p = 1 and intermediate values of (U,p)a tθ =0 .5, and is universally optimal up
to some threshold values of U and p for θ ≥ 0.6.
323.4.5 Heterogeneity in reemployment wages
So far, we have focused on the role of search eﬀectiveness and the exit rate to employment. In this
section, we want to study how ex-ante heterogeneity in reemployment wages and wage depreciation
aﬀect the optimal choice of policies. Besides the job ﬁnding probability, reemployment wages are
the second main determinant of the returns to search. The higher the reemployment wage, the
less costly it is to implement a certain utility level Us and hence to provide search incentives to
the worker.27 Moreover, revenues from wage taxes are potentially higher or expenditures on wage
subsidies lower.
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(a) UI, SA: low skilled U
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(b) UI, SA: medium skilled U
p
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(c) UI, SA: high skilled U
p
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(g) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.5: low skilled U
p
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(h) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.5: medium skilled U
p
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(i) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.5: high skilled U
p
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(j) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.7: low skilled U
p
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(k) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.7: medium skilled U
p
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(l) UI, JM, SA and JA with θ=0.7: high skilled U
p
UI SA    JM    JA
Note: Low/medium/high skilled: w = 880/1720/2680 EUR per month. At the right boundary of p where
the optimal policy switches from JA to UI, V
JA and V
UI are very close. Therefore, it can sometimes
happen that there are multiple switches between JA and UI as U increases for a given p. In such cases,
the ﬁgures show UI up to the largest value of U for which UI is optimal.
27 The level of U
s is the return to search for the worker, and the utility spread U
s −U
f determines the incentive cost
for the planner.
33Figure 8 displays the optimal choice of policies in the (U,p) space for, respectively, a low, medium,
and high-skilled worker when diﬀerent choice sets are available. The three types of workers are
deﬁned by the median wage in the lower, middle, and upper thirds of the wage distribution. As
providing search incentives becomes more costly the lower w, the range of U for which it is no
longer optimal to incentivize the worker and SA is optimal increases considerably, even for high
levels of p (see panels (a)-(c)). In return, the use of both UI and, if available, JM is reduced (see
panels (d)-(f)). Consequently, for any given level of initial promised utility, SA will be used earlier
in the unemployment spell the lower w. The relative share of JM in the remaining periods before
SA will increase, meaning that it will also be used earlier in the spell while the total use of UI will
be reduced.
The optimality of JA also depends on reemployment wages. The reason is that the value of
raising p increases with w: with the same increase in the exit rate, π(p), a higher value of work can
be obtained the larger w. Thus, the total returns to JA are larger for higher reemployment wages.
One implication of this is that the minimum eﬀectiveness required for JA to be used at all falls with
increasing w. Moreover, as can be seen from panels (g)-(l), the range of values of U and p for which
JA is optimal increases considerably with w in terms of both p and U. As discussed in Section
3.4.1, this also extends the use of UI and reduces the use of JM. Consequently, JA is more likely to
be optimal the lower the search eﬀectiveness, p, and hence the exit rate, π(p), but the higher the
reemployment wage, w.
Given these results, it is straightforward to derive what happens when there is not only ex-ante
heterogeneity in reemployment wages but also wage depreciation during unemployment. With wage
depreciation in addition to negative duration dependence in the exit rate to employment, both SA
and JM will be used earlier in the unemployment spell, whereas the use of UI will be reduced
compared with the case where wages remain constant. The importance of JA will diminish for two
reasons. First, JA will be optimal in fewer cases. Second, it will lose its ability to prevent SA as
the wage will eventually be so low that SA will already be optimal at very low levels of U even at
high levels of p (see panel (a)). Thus, JA may delay the use of SA but cannot prevent it entirely
when reemployment wages depreciate.
Having derived the optimal policy for diﬀerent levels of the job ﬁnding probability and reem-
ployment wages, it is interesting to discuss what may happen in countries like the US, which are
34characterized by much more ﬂexible labor markets than countries like Germany. The most im-
portant diﬀerence is probably that the job ﬁnding probabilities are higher while wages are lower
in the US than in Germany (see, e.g., the calibration by Pavoni and Violante (2007) for the US).
Moreover, negative duration dependence in the exit rate to employment is probably smaller and
wage depreciation larger in the US than in Germany. Given the same initial promised utility in both
countries, the eﬀects on the optimal use of SA, JM, and UI are ambiguous. Higher job ﬁnding rates
and weaker duration dependence delay the use of JM and SA in favor of UI, while lower wages and
higher wage depreciation imply the opposite. The implications for the use of JA are unambiguous,
though, because both eﬀects work in the same direction: the role of JA in optimal WTW programs
in economies like the US will be much less prominent because of lower returns to JA, as the value of
work is relatively low and falling rapidly during unemployment, while the job ﬁnding probabilities
are high anyway. If we take into account that the US system is less generous than the German one,
which implies lower initial promised utility, the diﬀerences will be smaller.
3.4.6 Sensitivity to the preference parameters
To check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the preference parameters of the model, we
ﬁrst vary the utility function of the worker. Rather than log utility, u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ is chosen with
intertemporal elasticity of substitution once above and once below one (σ ∈{ 0.8,1.2}).28 Note that
if σ is below (above) one, the initial utility provided by the actual policy is higher (lower) than in
the baseline case, because the same level of consumption implies higher (lower) utility. Moreover,
for the same reason a given utility diﬀerence can be obtained with a smaller (larger) diﬀerence in
beneﬁts, implying that beneﬁts must decline more slowly (faster) upon failure of the activity when
the incentive constraint binds under UI or JA. However, it is found that the optimal sequence of
policies remains almost unchanged. The only change is for σ<1 where JM and JA are used slightly
earlier in the unemployment spell, i.e. for slightly higher p.
Second, the disutility of eﬀort, e, is allowed to vary between work and search. The simulation
is repeated for the case where the disutility of eﬀort is assumed to be higher than the disutility of
work. The higher value of e =0 .93 rather than 0.84 in the baseline case is obtained when assuming
that the time the worker would like to spend on search is only half of the time he would spend on
work. Higher e implies higher incentive costs during UI and JA, but also makes work relatively more
28 The utility functions are normalized to match u(1) = 0 as under log utility.
35attractive. In the simulation, these eﬀects seem to oﬀset each other, because the optimal choice of
policies remains unchanged.
3.4.7 How to implement the optimal policy
An important issue is how the optimal policy could be implemented. As shown above, the optimal
amount of beneﬁts and sequence of policies depend on both the reemployment wage and the job
ﬁnding probability, as well as on how they change with the unemployment duration. Consequently,
implementing the optimal policy requires knowledge of the initial values w0 and π0 for each individ-
ual as well as their depreciation rates. The initial wage, w0, is observed from the last employment
spell and can be used to calculate the beneﬁt replacement rates. For the wage depreciation rate
and the exit rates to employment at any unemployment duration, a proﬁling approach would be
required. The ﬁrst step would be to estimate from historical data how individual characteristics af-
fect wt and πt for any unemployment duration t. Based on the estimated coeﬃcients, the predicted
values should be calculated for each individual at the beginning of unemployment and should be
updated whenever individual characteristics (like health or family situation) change over time.
Beneﬁt claims should depend on the last wage and should take into account the unemployment
risk. The reason is that the unemployment risk is highly correlated with the job ﬁnding probability
once unemployed, and it will be more diﬃcult to condition beneﬁts on expected job ﬁnding rates.
One way of accounting for unemployment risks would be to relate the amount of beneﬁts to previous
employment durations and unemployment experiences. Conditioning beneﬁts on past wages and
(un)employment experiences is actually common practice in most industrialized OECD countries.
However, in contrast to existing policies, beneﬁt claims should be deﬁned in ex-ante expected value
terms rather than as a ﬁxed amount per period. Conditional on the predicted individual wage
depreciation and job ﬁnding rates, they should then be distributed diﬀerently over time during
unemployment for diﬀerent types of workers. This approach is more likely to prevent that the
discrimination in beneﬁt levels across individuals and time required under the optimal policy beyond
the heterogeneity in ex-ante expected value terms might be perceived as unjust.
364 Conclusion
Job search assistance programs are one of the most widely used instruments for unemployed work-
ers in OECD countries. This paper studies the role of such programs in optimal welfare-to-work
programs based on an adapted version of the framework developed by Pavoni and Violante (2007).
Besides endogenizing all major policy parameters and allowing for a dynamic environment, a key
strength of the framework is that it takes into account the fact that there are alternative ways to use
available funds to reach a given policy objective. As a consequence, cost-eﬀectiveness is a necessary
but not suﬃcient condition for job search assistance to be part of the optimal policy scheme. It has
to be the least costly among all available policy instruments in a given period to be optimal in that
period.
In contrast to Pavoni and Violante (2007), the adapted version of the framework that we propose
takes into account the fact that certain worker characteristics like job search skills aﬀect the job
ﬁnding probability but not productivity in the job. This implies additional sources of ex-ante worker
heterogeneity and diﬀerential duration dependence in the exit rates. As the optimal policy strongly
depends on diﬀerences in the job ﬁnding probabilities, Pavoni and Violante (2007) neglect some
important factors that may lead to diﬀerent optimal decisions. Moreover, we show that introducing
job search assistance has important implications for the dynamics of the model: in contrast to
Pavoni and Violante (2007), depreciation in reemployment wages or negative duration dependence
in the exit rates to employment are no longer necessary for policy transitions to occur during
unemployment. If job search assistance is suﬃciently eﬀective and job ﬁnding probabilities are low,
it may be optimal to use JA at the beginning of unemployment. As search eﬀectiveness increases
because of JA, it will eventually be suﬃciently large for UI or JM to be optimal.
In the quantitative analysis the model is simulated for an economy that resembles West Germany
in the period 2000-2002. One of the advantages of using West Germany is the availability of
exceptionally rich and large administrative data that allow for most parameters of the model to
be estimated nonparametrically for the same sample of interest, which is a large improvement over
most existing calibrations of economic models. A comparison of the policy actually implemented in
West Germany in the period 2000-2002 with the optimal scheme indicates a substantial ineﬃciency
of the German system with respect to both beneﬁt payments and the use of JA. Actual long-run
beneﬁts were too high and expenditures on JA were wasted as JA was ineﬀective in this period.
37We also show that there would have been considerable gains from implementing tight monitoring
in West Germany, at least for workers with relatively low initial exit rates to employment.
Acknowledging the ﬁnding of the empirical literature that the eﬀects of JA vary with the particular
type of program as well as the time period and country considered, we analyze the optimal use of
JA as a function of its ability to raise exit rates to employment. For the West German setting we
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of JA on the exit rate to employment has to exceed 3%. As this number is at the
lower bound of the empirical estimates, JA will usually be part of optimal WTW programs. In line
with existing policies, JA should mainly be used at the beginning of unemployment and for short
durations. However, contrary to existing schemes, JA should be exclusively targeted at unemployed
workers with low initial exit rates to employment. For all other workers, JA should only be used if
they fail to ﬁnd a job within reasonable time despite high expected initial exit rates. The budget
savings from the availability of eﬀective JA can be substantial, reaching as much as 30% for some
types of workers compared with the optimal policy when JA is unavailable.
In economies without or only slow depreciation in reemployment wages, the main role of JA in
optimal WTW programs is to prevent situations in which it is no longer optimal to incentivize the
worker to provide positive search eﬀort. In such situations, exit rates to employment and hence
tax revenues would be zero, while expenditures on beneﬁts would be high. JA is used to restore
or maintain some minimum exit rate to employment which increases with the eﬀectiveness of JA
and with lower costs of JA. Because of this feature, JA dominates the use of monitoring: JM is an
important instrument to reduce incentive costs when job ﬁnding probabilities deteriorate because
this makes providing search incentives more costly, but, in contrast to JA, it cannot prevent exit
rates from declining.
In economies with rapid depreciation in reemployment wages, JA plays a less prominent role. As
the returns to JA decline with reemployment wages, JA will be optimal in fewer cases. Moreover, it
can only delay but no longer prevent the deterioration of the returns to search because it cannot stop
reemployment wages from declining. In this case, the results obtained by Spinnewijn (2009) and
Wunsch (2009b) suggest, that a combination of job search assistance and training that increases
human capital and thus reemployment wages would be required to keep the returns to search
suﬃciently high.
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41Appendix: Proof of the proposition
Pavoni and Violante (2007) show that with constant reemployment wages and in the absence of
negative duration dependence in the exit rate to employment JM and SA are absorbing once they
are optimal at some (U,p). Thus, JA will never be used thereafter. Now consider the case where UI is
optimal at (U,p). Pavoni and Violante (2007) show that in the absence of JA, JM and SA will never
be used thereafter, so the only choice is between JA and UI after UI. If p remains constant during
UI, it is suﬃcient to consider the dynamics with respect to U. The following Lemma establishes
that whenever w and p do not depreciate and UI is optimal at (U,p), V JA is more negatively sloped
than V UI if θJA ≤ π(p) and, hence, JA will never be optimal in the next period.
Lemma: For every (U,p) at which UI is optimal and θ ≤ π(p) we have that V UI
U (U,p) ≥
V JA
U (U,p) if V is submodular and w and p do not depreciate.
























JA the respective values under JA. If cUI ≤ cJA the envelope condition and the concavity
























Inequality (10) follows from θ ≤ π(p), VU < 0 and the concavity of V while inequality (11) is
implied by cUI >c JA. Inequality (12) follows from submodularity which implies that VU(U,ps) ≤
VU(U,p). Pavoni and Violante (2007) show that the IC constraint binds when UI is optimal, i.e.
U = u(cUI)+βU
f
UI. Satisfying the IC constraint under JA, i.e. U ≥ u(cJA)+βU
f











































UI > 0 (14)
which implies the contradiction that Us
JA >U s
UI. Thus, when θ ≤ π(p), cUI >c JA cannot hold
implying that cUI ≤ cJA must hold. 
Since search eﬀectiveness does not change during UI while promised utility falls, this completes
the proof of the proposition. 
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